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Abstract 
We assess the effects on Swedish industry input and output demands of different climate policy scenarios 
connected to energy policy induced by the Kyoto protocol. A unique data set containing firm level data 
on outputs and inputs during the years 1991 – 2001 is used to estimate a factor demand model, which is 
then simulated for different policy scenarios. Sector specific estimation suggests that the proposed 
quadratic profit function specification exhibit properties and robustness that are consistent with economic 
theory; that is, all own-price elasticities are negative and all output elasticities are positive. Furthermore, 
the elasticities show that the input demands are, in most cases, relatively inelastic. Simulation of the 
model for 6 different policy scenarios reveal that the effects on Swedish base industry of a EU level 
permit trade system is dependent on (i) removal or no removal of current CO2 tax, (ii) the established 
price of permits, and (iii) what will happen to the electricity price. Our analysis show that changes in 
electricity price may be more important than the price of permits for some sectors. + 
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1. Introduction 
The objective with this study is to evaluate the potential effects on CO2 emissions as 
well as the effects on the Swedish industry of the newly started system with CO2 
emission trading within the EU (ETS). In order to achieve our objective we develop an 
econometric partial equilibrium model for the Swedish industrial sector. The data set we 
use is a panel data set covering all firms within the industrial sector for the time period 
1990-2001. The employed methodology implies that we obtain estimates of supply as 
well as demand elasticities. These elasticities are then used in a second step to simulate 
a system of emission trading under various assumptions. 
Already here it should be emphasized that the model is embedded within a number of 
assumptions that will have effects on the results. These assumptions may be criticized 
for various reasons, and we will discuss some of them in the concluding section. 
The background to our study can be traced back to the Kyoto protocol article 
concerning flexible mechanisms in greenhouse gas policies. According to this article 
one of the options available to fulfill the obligations within the protocol is to make use 
of emission trading among the Annex I countries. As of January 1, 2005 such an 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) has been launched within the European Union. During 
the first trading period, 2005 to 2007, the ETS covers only CO2 emissions from large 
emitters in the power and heat generation industry, and in selected energy intensive 
industrial sectors such as combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel 
plants, and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp and paper. A 
size threshold based on production capacity or output determines which plants in these 
sectors are included in the scheme. Within this first phase more than 12 000 installations 
in the 25 Member States are covered, accounting for approximately 45 % of the EU’s 
total CO2 emissions. Due to the fact that the Swedish industry is relative energy 
intensive it is of interest, for at least two reasons, to study the effects on the Swedish 
industry. Firstly, the ETS will imply an explicit price on CO2, which directly affects the 
industry in the form of a price increase in fuels that emit CO2 (fossil fuels mainly). 
Secondly, and perhaps more important is the indirect effect on the market for electricity. 
A probable scenario is that the ETS will impose additional costs on electricity 
generation in Europe, which in turn may put an upward pressure on the price of 
electricity. Since the electricity markets have become more integrated this effect may 
spill over also on the Swedish electricity market in terms of higher prices. This in turn 
may have significant effects on the Swedish industry. We discuss this further below. 
When writing this, in October 2005, the emission trading market has been in operation 
for 10 months. Trading has been fairly low and the price has peaked at about 30 
EURO/ton CO2, and is right now between 20 and 25 EURO/ton. This is a significantly 
higher price than the predictions, which were in the range of 5 to 10 EURO/ton CO2. 
Also, the electricity price has risen about 30% in the same period (see 
www.nordpool.com), indicating that the introduction of an emission permit trade market 
could have impacted the electricity price, but this is not verified in any robust statistical 
way.    3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The theoretical model underlying the 
empirical analysis is presented in section 2, whereas the data used and the final 
empirical specification is presented in section 3. The empirical results along with the 
resulting price elasticities are presented in section 4. In section 5 we present a number of 
simulations, given different assumptions about the permit market. Section 6, finally, is 
devoted to some concluding comments and a discussion. 
2. The model 
In this section we derive the model that will be used subsequently in the empirical 
analysis. The model that will be used is based on standard micro economic foundations. 
More specifically this means that we assume that (a) each individual firm’s objective is 
to maximize profits, (b) each individual firm operates in a competitive environment, (c) 
each individual firm has a technology that transform inputs to a single output (and a 
byproduct) in an efficient way. Assumption (a) implies, among other things, that given 
an output decision, each firm will choose a bundle of inputs that minimize costs. 
Furthermore assumption (b) implies that all input and output prices are exogenous to the 
firm. Assumption (c) implies that we can describe the technology with a production 
function.
 1 
More specifically we assume that the firms are using an input vector x = [x1,…, xn] to 
produce a single output q. Denote the corresponding input price vector as w = [w1,…, 
wn], and the corresponding output price p. Then, given the assumptions above we can 
write the profit function for a representative firm as:  
) , (
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where q
* and x
* are the profit maximizing output and input choice. 
The profit function in (1) have the usual properties, i.e. increasing in p, non-increasing 
in  w, homogenous of degree 1 in p and w, and convex in p. Then, by applying 
Hotelling’s lemma to equation (1) we obtain supply and demand as functions of all 
prices, i.e.: 
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1 As a by-product to q we also assume that the firm produces a bad output, in this particular case CO2. 
However, a reasonable assumption is that CO2 is produced in a fixed proportion to the input of fuel. 
Thus, any reduction of CO2 production can only be accomplished by a reduction in fuel input. An 
increase of the CO2 tax, for example, will then affect firm profit through a higher price of fossil fuels. 
This property of a fixed proportion between q and CO2 also implies that we do not have to consider the 
“multi-output” property explicitly.    4
The sign under the argument denote the expected sign. That is, from theory it follows 
that the own price supply effect is positive, whereas the effect on supply from an 
increase in any input price is negative. The negative sign under w in equation (3) 
denotes the own price demand effect, whereas the question mark denote the cross-price 
effects that can’t be signed a priori. The sign of the cross price effect will depend on the 
technology, whether inputs are gross substitutes or gross complements in production. 
The reason for using the term gross is that a price change will lead to two different 
effects. A substitution effect and a scale, or production, effect; the latter due to a change 
in the profit maximizing level of production, which then may reinforce, or weaken, the 
pure substitution effect. That is, even if energy and labor are substitutes from a pure 
technological point of view, the scale effect from an increase in the energy price may 
lead to a decrease in labor input, i.e., energy and labor may be net substitutes and gross 
complements at the same time.
2 Which measure to be used, net or gross, is a matter of 
the objective with the study. In this case, where the main objective is to analyze gross 
effects on input demand and profits, the gross effects seems most attractive.
3 
It should be noted that equation (1) – (3) are derived under the assumption that all 
inputs are flexible. Among other things, this implies that the capital stock is allowed to 
adjust immediately as a result of price changes. Thus the model may be viewed as a 
long run model. 
 To summarize; given data on input and output quantities and their respective price, and 
an explicit form of the profit function, we can estimate equations (2) – (3). 
3. Empirical specification and data 
In order to obtain an operational form of the demand system we need to specify a 
functional form for the profit function. The functional form should be chosen in such a 
way that it puts as few restrictions as possible on the technology, but still is operational 
from an econometric point of view. Furthermore, for suitable parameter values it should 
satisfy the properties associated with a profit function, i.e. non-decreasing in p, non-
decreasing in w, homogenous in p and w, and convex in (p, w). The most common 
specifications used are the translog, generalized Leontief, and the normalized quadratic. 
All of these are second order approximations of any arbitrary profit function (see for 
example Chambers, 1988, for a discussion about flexible profit functions). 
                                                 
2 It can be shown under what conditions inputs can be net substitutes and gross complements, or vice 
versa, at the same time. The interested reader is referred to Chambers (1988). 
3 It should be noted that gross effect can be decomposed into the two sub effects. Furthermore, an 
alternative is to use the cost function instead of the profit function, which means that the demand 
functions would be conditioned on the production level, which in turn means that the substitution effects 
are net effects.   5
In this study we have chosen the normalized quadratic profit function (see Lau, 1972, 
1974, 1976a-b, 1978, for background and derivation of the normalized quadratic profit 
function and elasticity formulas)
4 which can be written as: 
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Linear homogeneity implies that we can normalize profits by dividing through both 
sides of equation (4) with one of the prices. In this case we normalize with the output 
price, which gives us the normalized profit function as: 
























where α0 = β0 + β1. Furthermore we impose the symmetry restriction by setting αij = αji. 
Applying Hotelling’s lemma gives us then the supply and demand functions as:
5 
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Thus by adding a stochastic term to equations (5) – (7), we have a system that can be 
estimated with standard techniques such as Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations 
(SURE), Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML), or some instrumental variable 
technique such as Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM).
6 
Now it is straightforward to derive the elasticities associated with normalized price 
changes.  
εij = -αij(wj/p)/xi,     i, j = 1, …, n     
which denotes the own-price demand elasticity when i = j, and the cross price elasticity 
when i ≠ j. The supply elasticities are defined as: 
∑ = − =
n
j ij ip 1ε ε                                                                                                         
εpi = εip(wi/p)(xi/q),          
                                                 
4 The selection procedure was “trial-and-error” until finding the most adequate specification in terms of 
the cost function being well behaved. 
5 ∂π/∂wi = -xi
*, and ∂π/∂p = q
*. This implies that ∂(π/p)/∂(wi/p) = -xi
*, and that q
* = π/p + (w/p)⋅x
*. 
6 See, for example, Green, 1993, or any standard text book in econometrics.   6
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The data set we use is a firm level unbalanced panel covering the period 1990-2001. It 
includes data on output and input data on quantity and value of labor, electricity, all 
types of fuels used, and capital investment. Fuels are aggregated into a single variable. 
For the firms analyzed here, the fossil fuel content in relation to total fuel use is 70-
80%. The data set contains all industry plants with more than 5 employees (86 000 rows 
of data) and is classified according to the SNI industry standard (see www.scb.se for a 
description of the SNI classification system). Due to the panel data structure several 
approaches are possible in the estimations of the demand and supply functions. One 
possible approach is a panel data approach by just pooling the data or include fixed 
effects in some form. A pure pooling approach means, however, that we impose very 
restrictive assumptions on the model. One such restriction is that every plant, 
independent of its type activity, are assumed to have the same technology. This means, 
for example, that a price change will have the same marginal effect on all plants in the 
industry. The advantage with the pooling approach is of course that the degrees of 
freedom will be large since the number of observations equals the number plants times 
the number of years. 
An alternative, and less restrictive, in terms of differences in technology, approach is to 
allow plants to be heterogeneous on a certain levels of aggregation. That means that the 
parameters are sector specific for the chosen level of aggregation. In practice this means 
that we separately estimate sector specific demand systems. The advantage with this 
approach is that we allow all parameters to vary between the different sectors. The 
disadvantage is that the chosen level of aggregation does not correspond to differences 
and similarities in the actual technology. However, this is a general problem in this kind 
of analysis. In this paper we have chosen this second approach. 
Given this approach we can write the normalized profit for a representative firm in 
sector m as: 






























where M is the number of sectors, i.e. the aggregation level. The corresponding supply 
and demand system is then: 
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The econometric specification includes error terms in the profit, supply, and demand 
functions described above (assumed to have white noise properties). In the final   7
empirical specification we allow for technological progress by adding a trend variable 
that interacts with all prices in the profit function. This implies that derived demand and 
supply equations will include a time trend. Also, we introduce “fixed effects” by 
dividing each industry studied into size groups (by quartiles from employee data), 
meaning that we also, to a limited degree admittedly, allow for different technologies 
within sectors. 
Given (11) – (13) it is now straightforward to define the price elasticities as: 
εijm = -αijm(wjm/pm)/xim,       (14) 
∑ = − =
n
j ijm ipm 1ε ε ,                                                                                                          (15) 
εpim = εipm(wim/pm)(xim/qm),       (16) 
∑ = − =
n
i pim ppm 1ε ε ,  (17) 
for  
i, j = 1, …, n    m = 1,…, M 
Equations (14) - (17) defines the demand elasticities, the supply elasticity with respect 
to input prices, and the own price supply elasticity.  
In table 1 we present the sectors of the data set. Note that in this study, we focus on the 
base industry which includes the pulp & paper industry, mining, chemistry, and iron and 
steel sectors.  
As discussed above the estimation approach implies a classification of plants into M 
different sectors. The classification system used here follows the SNI classification 
system at the 2, 3 and 4 digit levels, which means that we classify plants into 17 
different industries, or sectors (see table 1). To limit the amount of results presented, in 
this paper we only focus on the so called base industry, which is also the most relevant 
part of the manufacturing industry to investigate in terms of CO2 emissions.
7 All trading 
firms within the ETC can be found in this category. This means we are left with the 
following industry sectors: trading sector (1), mining industry, except iron ore, (2), 
mining industry, iron ore, (3), pulp and paper (4), chemical (5), rubber and plastic (6), 
stone and non-metal mineral (7), and iron and steel (8).  
                                                 
7 Also, the base industry is the most electricity intensive part of manufacturing, and electricity price is 
likely to be influenced by the trading system (more on this below in the simulation section).   8
Table 1. Industry branch codes classification of Swedish manufacturing according to 
Statistics Sweden (SNI). Base industry includes the following sectors: pulp & paper 
industry, mining, chemistry, iron and steel (the 8 sectors specified in 3
rd column). 
SNI (branch code)  Description  Base industry   
composite sector  1. Trading sector (ETS)  1 
10+11+14  2. Mining industry, not iron ore  2 
131+132  3. Mining industry, iron ore  3 
15+16  4. Food industry   
17+18+19  5. Textile industry   
201+202+203+204+205  6. Wood industry   
2111+2112+2121+…+2124  7. Pulp and paper industry  4 
22  8. Printing and other paper 
related industry 
 
231+232+233+24  9. Chemical industry  5 
251+252  10. Rubber and plastic industry  6 
261+…+268  11. Stone and non-metal 
mineral industry 
7 
27+28  12. Iron and steel industry  8 
29  13. Machinery industry   
30+…+33  14. Electro industry   
34  15. Motor vehicle industry   
35+361+…+366  16. Other manufacturing 
industry 
 
37  17. Recycling industry   
 
Within in each industry it is assumed that the representative plant produces a scalar 
output (q), using labor (x1), gross capital investments (∆x2), electricity (x3), and fuel 
(x4)
8. The associated prices are p, and w1 – w4, respectively. Input prices are calculated 
from data on quantity and value for electricity, fuel and labor, which means that these 
prices are firm specific. The price of investments is an investment good price index 
taken from Statistics Sweden’s (www.scb.se) online data base, and is the same for all 
firms. Furthermore, it is assumed that the representative firm adjusts output and all 
inputs instantaneously to the desired level, i.e., there are no adjustment costs in the 
model.
9 Hence, the model can be considered a long-run model. Note that in the 
empirical analysis, gross investment, which we here denote ∆x2, replace the capital 
                                                 
8 The fuel variable is a composite variable consisting of all fuels used where 80-90% can be categorized 
as fossil fuels. 
9 An alternative specification is of course to allow for sluggish adjustment of some of the inputs, for 
example capital, by assuming that there are costs of adjustment. Such a specification would imply a 
dynamic model where the magnitude of the adjustment costs determines the path towards a steady state. 
See Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) for an overview of such models, and Lundgren and Sjöström (1999 and 
2001) for applications on Swedish data. Lundgren and Sjöström find no evidence of capital stock 
sluggishness in Swedish industry as a whole.   9
stock, x2. Gross capital investment is defined as ∆x2 = x2 – (1 – δ) ∆x2,-1 where δ is 
depreciation (-1 indicate lagged value). This, we assume, does not alter the parameter 
interpretations, since ∆x2 is basically x2 differentiated. The elasticities, however, become 
somewhat different in magnitude since (d∆x2/dw2)(w2/∆x2)  is not equal to 
(dx2/dw2)(w2/x2) unless d∆x2/dx2 = ∆x2/x2. Since we lack data on the capital stocks, and 
have no adequate procedure to approximate them, we have chosen to specify the 
empirical model in terms of gross investment instead of a proxy for capital stock. 
Descriptive statistics for the trading sector and the rest of the industry are provided in 
table 2a-b and figure 1a-b. From table 2a and 2b we can see that, not surprisingly, the 
variance across firms is significantly higher looking at the whole industry compared to 
the trading sector, indicating that the trading sector is relatively homogenous. Further, 
the cost share of fuel and electricity is considerably higher in the trading sector 
compared to the industry as a whole. 
Table 2a. Descriptive statistics, the trading sector. Average across plants 1990-2001. 
   Mean Std.  deviation Cost share  Std. deviation 
Fuel (GWh)  200 496 420 624 0.11 0.11
Electricity (GWh)  218 299 333 076 0.15 0.10
Labor (# of employees)  478 564 0.56 0.16
Real investment value (TSEK)  56 763 113 276 0.18 0.16
Real output value (TSEK)  1 330 722 1 860 594
Nobs 1  439
 
Table 2b. Descriptive statistics, total industry. Average across all plants 1990-2001. 
  Mean Std.  deviation Cost share  Std. deviation 
Fuel (GWh)  3 698 39 844 0.03 0.04
Electricity (GWh)  4 071 31 761 0.04 0.04
Labor (# of employees)  82 253 0.82 0.13
Real investment value (TSEK)  3 769 24 818 0.11 0.12
Real output value (TSEK)     131 898 705 774
Nobs 69  791
 
Figure 1a and b displays the development of the cost shares over time for the trading 
and non-trading sector respectively. Two main conclusions can be drawn from the 
figures. The first one is that the cost shares have been fairly stable over time for both the 
trading and the non-trading sector. Secondly, a comparison of the trading and non-
trading sector reveals large differences in the sense that that the trading sector on 
average is significantly more energy and capital intensive than the non-trading sector.   10






















Figure 1a. Cost shares for the trading sector, 1990-2001. 






















Figure 1b. Cost shares for the non-trading sector, 1990-2001. 
The development of the mean and the variation within the trading sector is displayed in 
figure 2. Here we can see that the mean as well as the variation has been stable over 
time.   11
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Figure 2. Cost share for fuel within the trading sector, 1990-2001. 
 
4. Results 
The equation system (11), (12), and (13) was initially estimated simultaneously with 
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML).
10 However, when including the supply 
equation, (12), the system estimation did not converge, or produced nonsense results. 
Therefore, we only estimated equation (11) and (13), still obtaining all parameters of the 
system. The left-hand side variable of equation (11), profits, was approximated by 
taking revenues and subtracting the cost of investment, labor, electricity, and fuels (cost 
of materials was not included since we lack data on this variable). We also included size 
dummys specifically for each sector based on quartiles for the labor variable (amount of 
employees), and a time trend accounting for technical progress. Both the size dummys 
and the time trend possibly co-vary with input prices. The obtained parameter estimates 
was then used to calculate the elasticities according to equations (14) to (17). The 
parameter estimates for each sector are presented in Appendix 1 (Note that parameters 
associated with dummys or time trends are not presented. These can be obtained from 
authors upon request). For compactness, we only present the results for the trading 
sector (sector 1), in the form of an elasticity matrix, Table 3, in this section. The 
elasticity matrices for the rest of the industry (sector 2-8) can be found in Appendix 2. 
However, we offer some comments on both trading and non-trading sector results 
below. 
                                                 
10 FIML is a standard method in this type of multiple equations model. System of equations and 
estimation of the type performed in this paper can for example be found in Berndt (1991). See also 
Kriström and Lundgren (2003) or Brännlund and Lundgren (2004) for similar system equation 
estimations.   12
The first column of the matrices denote which input/output the elasticity is associated 
to; labor (x1), gross capital investment (∆x2), electricity (x3), fuel (x4), and production 
(q). The first row indicate which price the elasticity relates to; the hourly wage (w1), 
investment good price index (w2), price of electricity (w3), price of fuel (w4), and price of 
the output (p). The second column show cost shares for the inputs. This means that the 
second column-second row denote labor cost share, s, while third column-second row 
denote the own-price elasticity for labor (-0.71). 
Table 3. Own-price and cross-price elasticities for the trading sector and cost shares, s. 
All elasticities and cost shares evaluated at mean values for the years 1990-2001. 
  s w1  w2 w 3  w4 P 
x1   0,56 -0,71 0,07 -0,11 -0,30 1,05 
∆x2  0,18 0,13 -0,51 0,19 -0,20 0,39 
x3  0,14 -0,30 0,28 -0,97 -0,47 1,45 
x4  0,11 -1,20 -0,44 -0,69 -0,72 3,05 
q    -0,12 -0,02 -0,06 -0,09 0,31 
Before proceeding to comment the elasticities for the specific sectors, it is convenient 
commenting on the elasticities in Table 3.  
All own-price elasticities have the expected sign stipulated by theory; that is, a price 
increase in any of the inputs will decrease demand for that specific input. For output, the 
opposite relation holds, i.e., a price increase will increase demand for the product. We 
can also conclude that demand is inelastic for all inputs but electricity, for which the 
own price elasticity is close to unity. The own-price elasticity for fuel is -0.72, which 
would suggest that an increase in fuel price would induce an increase in the cost share 
of fuel. This implies that the firms cannot fully substitute away from fuel to another 
input in case of a fuel price increase. Furthermore, the results suggest that an output 
price increase will increase production (0.31). 
Looking at the cross-price elasticities, it is worth noting that a higher fuel price leads to 
lower production and lower use of all other inputs. This would imply that fuel is a gross 
complement to the other inputs. If it is also a complement in a technical sense is, 
however, not possible to deduce from table 3a.  
The results in Table 3 can now be used to analyze possible effects of different policies 
affecting the price of fuel or the other inputs. For example, we are able to investigate the 
effects of introducing an emission permit market for CO2, which is the case for Europe 
since the beginning of 2005. Assume, for example, that the current CO2 tax is replaced 
by a trading system. The effect of such a shift in policy instrument is utterly dependent 
upon what price that will be established for emission rights (when writing this the price 
is about 25 euros per ton CO2). If the emission price right is less than the current tax, the 
use of fuel, and thus CO2 emissions, will decrease, and vice versa. We also see that 
production, employment, and the use of electricity will increase. In the next section a 
more in depth simulation of different policy change scenarios will be conducted.    13
In tables A2a-g (see Appendix 2), we show elasticities, and cost shares, for each sector 
(2-8). The cost shares differ considerable across sectors for the variables of interest 
here. The electricity cost share range between 4 and 16%. The lowest cost share for 
electricity is found in the iron and steel industry, while mining of iron ore has the 
highest. The implication is that an increase in the electricity price, as a consequence of a 
policy change, will have very different effects on the different sectors. It should be 
noted that there is probably also a considerable variation within sectors. The cost shares 
for fuel have about the same range as for electricity. The rubber and plastic sector has 
the lowest, 2%, while mining industry has the highest, 12%. This suggests that if fuel 
price goes up, the mining industry will be the sector that is relatively most negatively 
affected.  
The price elasticities have the expected sign; that is, all own-price elasticities are 
negative, and the output elasticities are positive. The reader should, however, note that 
the elasticities vary in magnitude, and in case of cross-price elasticities also in sign, 
across sectors. This suggests that the various sectors will adapt differently to price 
changes.  
5. Simulations 
In this section we will simulate the introduction of a permit market for CO2. Using the 
elasticity matrices presented in the previous section we assess the partial effects of a 
policy change on a given sector. Before describing the different scenarios and the results 
from the simulations, we wish to alert the reader to some crucial assumptions. The first 
important assumption is that all firms in every sector are price takers. Second, a policy 
change does not induce general equilibrium effects. That is, policy changes only have 
effects on the prices of those inputs directly affected by a specific policy. For example, 
an increased CO2 tax translates directly and fully into an upward price change of those 
inputs that produce CO2 emissions. No other prices are assumed to change. This may be 
realistic in some cases, and less realistic in other cases. It is, for example, realistic to 
assume that significant changes in the energy and/or the CO2 taxation system will have 
repercussions in the labor market. We can see from the elasticity measures that 
increased energy costs has a negative effect on labor demand, which may have effects 
on the labor market by reducing wage rates. This in turn dampens the overall cost 
increase, and thereby also has a dampening effect on the energy and employment 
decrease. The model we use here cannot track these types of general equilibrium effects, 
but the reader should be aware that they exist to some degree. To account for all 
interactive effects between all sectors and markets, a computable general equilibrium 
model (CGE) would be more suitable.
11 However, these type of models are not without 
flaws, and the modeling approach we have chosen to use in this analysis certainly has 
some benefits compared to CGE:s. For example, the parameters used in the simulation 
have been estimated using a very detailed micro-panel data, and the massive amount of 
information which it contains is important to consider when choosing between different 
modeling approaches. It should, however, be stressed that even though we have the 
                                                 
11 Recent CGE analysis of the impact on the Swedish economy due to the emission trading program can 
be found in Hill and Kriström (2005).   14
data, we cannot study each company separately. The effects from, for example, price 
changes are to be interpreted as effects for a group of firms, or as a mean effect for a 
specific group of firms. 
As in the previous section we have chosen to present simulation results from the trading 
sector in this section, and the rest of the base industry simulation results are presented in 
an appendix (Appendix 3). However, we comment on simulation results from both 
sectors in the text below.  
The scenarios are presented in table 4. 












1 5  2  yes 
2 5  2  no 
3 10  4  yes 
4  10 4 no 
5 25  8  yes 
6  25 8 no 
Note: The original analysis was conducted using SEK as monetary measure 
with the price of an emission permit set to 50, 100, and 250 SEK/ton, and the 
electricity price increase set to 0.02, 0.04, and 0.08 SEK/kWh. Here we have 
used the exchange rate 1 Euro = 10 SEK. 
 
The introduction of a permit market and removed CO2 tax will have effect on the price 
of fuel which the firms use as input in production. In the sectors we have chosen there is 
always a fraction of trading firms. It is also assumed that a fuel price increase will make 
the production of electricity more costly, and therefore, as a second step, electricity 
price will increase causing additional burden on the firms. 
The simulation procedure is as follows. 
1.  First, a CO2 emission permit market is introduced. The price of a permit is 5, 10, 
or 25 Euro/ton CO2. The CO2 tax is removed for the trading sector or not. The 
permit price is translated into a price change in fuel, which is dependent on the 
fuel mix and production technology used by each sector (the fuel variable is a 
composite of all kinds of fuels, but mainly fossil fuels). 
2.  When the industry has adapted the input mix and the output level to the initial 
policy change, the price of electricity is assumed to increase by 2, 4 or 8 
Euro/GWh. This leads to further substitution and adaptation.    15
The simulation is thus a two-step procedure, and the results are presented for a number 
of variables for both steps. All changes are in percent. If, for example, the change in the 
fuel input variable is -0.054, it means that fuel use is down 5.4%.
12  
We use the following notation for the simulation results: 
D_X = percentage change in variable X. 
Step 1 
D_x11 = change in labor, step 1. 
D_∆x21 = change in investment, step 1. 
D_x31 = change in electricity, step 1. 
D_x41 = change in fuel, step 1. 
Step 2 
D_x12 = change in labor, step 2. 
D_∆x22 = change in investment, step 2. 
D_x32 = change in electricity, step 2. 
D_x42 = change in fuel, step 2. 
Total effect 
D_x1 = total change in labor. 
D_∆x2 = total change in investment. 
D_x3 = total change in electricity. 
D_x4 = total change in fuel. 
D_q = total change in output level. 
D_CO2 = total change in CO2 emissions. 
D_π = total change in profits. 
                                                 
12 The simulation technique used here is the same as in Brännlund and Lundgren (2004); that is, we 
calculate the effect that the policy change has on actual prices, and then use the relevant elasticity to 
assess the effect on input factor and output demand. For example, to obtain the “policy-to-fuel price-
translation coefficient” we relate total emissions of CO2 (in kilos) to total use of fuels ( GWh) for each 
sector by a simple regression. 
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All simulations are based on sector specific CO2 tax rates as benchmark values. These 
benchmark values are calculated as the mean tax rate for that specific sector in 2001. 
The benchmark tax rate varies quite a lot across sectors. For example, the stone and 
non-metal mineral industry pays about 2.3 Euro/ton, while the pulp and paper industry 
pays 17.6 Euro/ton. These differences are of significant importance for the effects of the 
policy changes considered here, especially in the case when the CO2 tax is removed. 
Also, all other benchmark values, such as prices and quantities, are calculated as mean 
values specific for each sector in 2001. The sector specific benchmark CO2 tax rates are 
(Euro/ton): trading = 5.2; mining (iron ore excluded) = 8.0; iron ore mining = 12.5; pulp 
and paper = 17.8; chemical = 13.5; rubber and plastic = 17.6; stone and non-metal 
mineral = 2.3; iron and steel = 9.5. 
The simulation results for the trading sector are presented in Table 5. The results from 
the other sectors are presented in Appendix 3 (Table A3a-g).  
In Step 1 – in scenarios 1, 3, and 5 – a permit market is introduced and current CO2 tax 
is removed. This would, for the trading sector, mean an actual “tax reduction” compared 
to today’s level.
13 In sim3 and sim5 the price of a permit exceeds current level of the 
CO2 tax, and which can be interpreted as a “tax increase”. In sim2, sim4, and sim6, the 
CO2 tax is not removed, which simply means that CO2 permit trading can be viewed as 
a “tax increase”. The effects in step 1 of sim1 are that the trading sector increases the 
use of all inputs marginally; employment and investments increases both by 0.1%, and 
the use of electricity and fuel by 0.2 and 0.3% respectively. However, if the permit price 
becomes 10 or 25 euro, and the current CO2 tax remains, then trading firms will 
experience a cost increase, which decreases the use of all inputs (sim3 and sim5). In 
sim2, sim4, and sim6 the results indicate a lower use of all input, since the CO2 tax is 
not removed. Employment reduces by 3.7 to 18.3%, and fuel use goes down by 8.7 to 
43.6% depending on the permit price. This suggests that the effects are quite large in 
these scenarios, and we can expect significant structural change since firms with large 
cost shares for fuel probably will exit out of business. A positive effect, however, is that 
domestic CO2 emissions will decrease considerably. 
Step 2 assesses the effect of an electricity price increase. This price increase is assumed 
to occur due to increased fuel costs in certain types of electricity production; the 
increased fuel price being a result of introducing a permit market at EU level. As 
expected, the increase in electricity price decreases the use of electricity. The reduction 
is in the range 10 to 40%, depending on the size of the price increase. The electricity 
price increase leads to further lowering of fuel use, which leads to further decrease in 
CO2 emissions. Note that investments tend to increase as a result of a higher electricity 
price. This suggests that electricity and capital are gross substitutes in production.  
                                                 
13 Note that in the second step we are only considering an electricity price increase, and thus sim1=sim2, 
sim3=sim4, and sim5=sim6.   17
Table 5. Effects of policy on labor input, investments, electricity input, fuel input, 
output, emissions, and profits (percentage change) in the Trading sector. All 
benchmark values from 2001 (specific mean values for each sector). 
Step 1 
 D_x11 D_∆x21D _ x 31D _ x 41
Sim1  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003
Sim2  -0.037 -0.024 -0.056 -0.087
Sim3  -0.035 -0.023 -0.054 -0.084
Sim4  -0.073 -0.049 -0.113 -0.174
Sim5  -0.145 -0.097 -0.223 -0.345
Sim6  -0.183 -0.123 -0.282 -0.436
Step 2 
 D_x12 D_∆x22D _ x 32D _ x 42
Sim1  -0.011 0.019 -0.099 -0.070
Sim2  -0.011 0.019 -0.099 -0.070
Sim3  -0.022 0.039 -0.197 -0.140
Sim4  -0.022 0.039 -0.197 -0.140
Sim5  -0.045 0.078 -0.395 -0.281
Sim6  -0.045 0.078 -0.395 -0.281
Total effect  
 D_  x1 D_  ∆x2 D_ x3 D_ x4
Sim1  -0.010 0.020 -0.096 -0.067
Sim2  -0.048 -0.005 -0.155 -0.157
Sim3  -0.058 0.0155 -0.252 -0.224
Sim4  -0.096 -0.010 -0.310 -0.315
Sim5  -0.190 -0.019 -0.618 -0.626
Sim6  -0.229 -0.045 -0.677 -0.717
 D_q  D_CO2  D_π
Sim1  -0.006 -0.067 -0.009
Sim2  -0.018 -0.157 -0.021
Sim3  -0.024 -0.224 -0.029
Sim4  -0.035 -0.315 -0.041
Sim5  -0.070 -0.626 -0.082
Sim6  -0.081 -0.717 -0.093
 
Looking at the total effects we find that the cost decrease from sim1 is offset by the cost 
increase which follows from the electricity price increase. In all scenarios, we can 
observe that the total effect on production and profits are modest compared to the 
effects on fuel and electricity use and CO2 emissions. These results are due to the fact 
that the cost chares and marginal products for fuel and electricity are small. Also, there   18
may be “invisible” substitution away from fuel and electricity to some other input which 
is not included in our empirical specification. For example, raw material, which in some 
firms is a significant input, is not a part of the production function in our analysis.  
The effects on the trading sector of introducing a permit market are not surprising, and 
the simulation results are basically what you would expect. The effects on the trading 
sector are, to a large extent, dependent on whether the current CO2 tax is removed or 
not. If the tax is kept at its current level, then the permit market will simply be an 
additional burden on the industry which drives up the cost of fuels. If combined with an 
electricity price increase, which is likely with an EU level permit market, this 
effect/burden is even more significant.  
In tables A2a-g (see Appendix 2) the simulation results for the rest of the base industry 
sectors are presented. In general, the effects of the different scenarios on these sectors 
follow the same pattern as for the trading sector. However, there are significant 
differences in magnitude of the effects between sectors. The largest percentage changes 
are found in the iron ore mining, chemical, stone and non-metal mineral, and iron and 
steel industry. In sim5 and sim6 the use of fuel in the stone and non-mineral industry 
drops 100%, which indicates that the “mean” firm in this sector exits the industry. The 
effects on the mining sector (not iron ore) are relatively modest. Furthermore, it is clear 
that the energy intensive sector pulp and paper is not so much affected by step 1 (permit 
market only). However, the electricity price increase (step 2) has a quite severe effect on 
this sector.  
In sum; the effects on the Swedish base industry (forest, chemical, mining, steel), 
including the trading sector, of the introduction of a CO2 emission permit market on EU 
level are dependent on (i) what price is established for a permit, (ii) what happens to the 
current CO2 tax, and (iii) what happens to the electricity price. The simulations show 
that the effects can be significant, in terms of competitiveness, when the current CO2 tax 
is not removed, and these effects vary considerable across sectors. The effects probably 
vary a great deal within sectors too. This suggests that structural change will occur with 
a possibility that some firms will go out of business. In the case where the current CO2 
tax is removed the effects are not clear cut. A permit price below 10 Euro/ton will 
probably mean an improvement, in terms of cost level, for many firms. However, this is 
dependent on the electricity price increase. A price increase of more than 4 Euro/ GWh 
is likely to induce an overall increased cost level for many firms, even though the price 
of permits establishes at a fairly low level. 
6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effects of introducing a permit market 
for CO2 emissions on the Swedish base industry in general and on the permit trading 
sector in particular. By “effects” we mean changes in factor demand, output, emissions, 
and profits.  
Sector specific estimation of factor demand and profit functions exhibit properties and 
robustness that are consistent with economic theory; that is, all own-price elasticities are 
negative and all output elasticities are positive. Furthermore, the elasticities show that 
the demands are, in most cases, relatively inelastic.    19
Simulation of the model for 6 different policy scenarios suggest that the effects on 
Swedish base industry of a permit trade system is dependent on (i) removal or no 
removal of current CO2 tax, (ii) the established price of permits, and (iii) what will 
happen to the electricity price. Our analysis show that changes in electricity price may 
be more important than the price of permits for some sectors. Note, however, that the 
price of electricity is dependent on the price of permits, which in turn depends on how 
many permits that are emitted throughout the whole European trading system. The 
results presented in this article are basically in line with findings in recent CGE studies 
performed on the Swedish economy with similar scenarios. See Hill and Kriström (2002 
and 2005), and Nilsson and Kriström (2002). 
Finally, we would like to stress that simulations of the type performed in this paper are 
not without flaws. The underlying parameters should be viewed as “local 
approximations” and simulations that stretch beyond the price fluctuations observed 
historically in the data are uncertain. As a consequence sim5 and sim6, the most 
extreme scenarios, should be interpreted with care. Careful interpretation is also 
motivated by the partial equilibrium setting used here. There are reasons to believe that 
policy reforms of the kind simulated here will have effects on other markets. For 
example we can’t rule out possible effects on the labor market. However, what the 
effects will be on wage setting and employment can’t be determined a priori without 
further assumptions of the functioning of the labor market. This in turn implies that we 
can’t say what the final effects on the industry will be. There are at least two problems 
associated with this. The first is that the simulations per se do not take into account 
possible interactions. The second is that the estimated parameters in our model are 
biased due to endogenous right hand side variables, such as the wage rate. Thus, high 
ranked for future research is to include the labor market explicitly into this kind of 
model. This would not only potentially improve the quality of the results when 
evaluating policy reforms like the one here, but also contribute to the understanding of 
how wage setting and employment is affected by energy and environmental policy. 
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Appendix 1. 
Table A1. Parameter estimates for all sectors (m = 1,…, 8). * indicates significance at 
5%-level. Data covers years 1990-2001, and all plants with employees > 5.  
Param.  Sector 1  Sector 2  Sector 3  Sector 4  Sector 5  Sector 6  Sector 7  Sector 8 
m 0 α   14838.9* 1973.81* -573.440 8882.49* 9815.15*  2682.43*  2179.49*  6092.74* 
m 1 α    -1083.76*  -196.497*  7302.57  -665.811*  -442.313*  -336.158*  -278.753*  -443.922* 
m 2 α   -492756* -77941.3*  -443363 -644405* -271272*  -96831.5*  -73771.4*  -181996* 
m 3 α   -544755* -103083*  -447189 -390719* -87273.5* -17795.8*  -32324.6*  -92806.9* 
m 4 α   -629004* -18097.2*  -403439 -196823* -107084*  -8254.55*  -141231*  -124671* 
m 11 α   117.808* 2.80321*  12.8667 14.4696*  7.64197  14.2830*  8.71173*  10.5576* 
m 22 α   .88E+08 .49E+07* .15E+08  .68E+08* 22704.0 .40E+07  .12E+08*  .19E+08* 
m 33 α   .89E+08* 361802  .53E+08  .16E+08*  .10E+08* 766273* 478621  .44E+07* 
m 44 α   .83E+08* .12E+07*  .46E+08 .14E+08* .12E+08*  743347* .15E+08*  .43E+07* 
m 12 α   -16526.9 1191.00 27487.2  79067.9* 12464.3  4083.46  -3411.40  -1704.39 
m 13 α   22397.1  425.994  -11985.1 28659.4* -8034.90  429.079 2249.76* 3412.26 
m 14 α   83350.3* -690.726*  5150.20  3732.43  7358.70  -217.713 1421.22  3555.17 
m 23 α   -.29E+08 .16E+07* .52E+08 .61E+08* -.53E+07  -424193  312559 -.30E+07 
m 24 α   .42E+08 -360511. .89E+08  .27E+08* .72E+07  354017 .20E+07 .34E+07 
m 34 α   .58E+08* -22537.6  .44E+08 .10E+08  .36E+07 -163536  .26E+07*  .36E+07* 
Nobs 1439  1137  145  2117  2736  2905 3333  12775 
Note: sectors 1-8 are: the trading sector (1), the mining industry except iron ore (2), the 
iron ore mining industry (3), the pulp and paper industry (4), the chemical industry (5), 
the rubber and plastic industry (6), the stone and non-metal mineral industry (7), and 
iron, steel and metal industry (8).   23
Appendix 2 
Table A2a. Own-price and cross-price elasticities for the mining industry except iron 
ore, and cost shares, s. All elasticities and cost shares evaluated at mean values for the 
years 1990-2001. 
  s w1  w2 w 3  w4 p 
x1   0.66 -0.41 -0.14 -0.09 0.11  0.53 
∆x2  0.14 -0.43 -1.38 -0.88 0.14  2.55 
x3  0.07 -0.46 -1.39 -0.59 0.03  2.42 
x4  0.12 0.53 0.22 0.03 -1.09 0.32 
q    -0.10 -0.15 -0.09 -0.01 0.36 
 
Table A2b. Own-price and cross-price elasticities for the iron ore industry, and cost 
shares, s. All elasticities and cost shares evaluated at mean values for the years 1990-
2001. 
  s w1  w2 w 3  w4 p 
x1   0.56 -0.11 -0.17 0.07 -0.03 0.24 
∆x2  0.21 -0.25 -0.10 -0.34 -0.57 1.25 
x3  0.16  0.19 -0.63 -0.61 -0.49 1.55 
x4  0.08 -0.13 -1.67 -0.79 -0.81 3.39 
q    -0.04 -0.17 -0.11 -0.15 0.48 
 
Table A2c. Own-price and cross-price elasticities for the pulp and paper industry and 
cost shares, s. All elasticities and cost shares evaluated at mean values for the years 
1990-2001. 
 s  w1 w 2 w 3 w 4 p 
X1   0.71 -0.17 -0.73 -0.37 -0.05 1.32 
∆x2  0.16 -1.24 -0.83 -1.04 -0.44 3.56 
x3  0.09 -0.67 -1.11 -0.43 -0.26 2.47 
x4  0.05 -0.16 -0.89 -0.48 -0.62 2.15 
q    -0.17 -0.26 -0.17 -0.08 0.68 
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Table A2d. Own-price and cross-price elasticities for the chemical industry and cost 
shares, s. All elasticities and cost shares evaluated at mean values for the years 1990-
2001. 
 s  w1 w 2 w 3 w 4 p 
x1   0.74 -0.17 -0.19 0.20 -0.17 0.33 
∆x2  0.15 -0.40 0.00 0.19 -0.24 0.45 
x3  0.07 0.96 0.44 -1.45  -0.46 0.50 
x4  0.04 -1.09 -0.74 -0.61 -1.90 4.34 
q    -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 0.15 
 
Table A2e. Own-price and cross-price elasticities for the rubber and plastic industry, 
and cost shares, s. All elasticities and cost shares evaluated at mean values for the years 
1990-2001. 
  s w1  w2 w 3  w4 p 
x1   0.79 -0.48 -0.12 -0.02 0.01  0.60 
∆x2  0.14 -0.44 -0.38 0.07 -0.06 0.82 
x3  0.05 -0.27 0.23 -0.68 0.17 0.55 
x4  0.02 0.29 -0.41 0.31 -1.63 1.45 
q    -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.20 
 
Table A2f. Own-price and cross-price elasticities for the stone and non-metal mineral 
industry, and cost shares, s. All elasticities and cost shares evaluated at mean values for 
the years 1990-2001. 
   w 1  w2 w 3  w4 p 
x1   0.77 -0.39 0.12 -0.14 -0.07 0.48 
∆x2  0.10  0.68 -2.00 -0.09 -0.43 1.84 
x3  0.05 -1.29 -0.14 -0.40 -1.60 3.43 
x4  0.08 -0.18 -0.20 -0.48 -2.05 2.91 
q    -0.12 -0.08 -0.09 -0.27 0.56 
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Table A2g. Own-price and cross-price elasticities for the iron and steel industry, and 
cost shares, s. All elasticities and cost shares evaluated at mean values for the years 
1990-2001. 
  s w1  w2 w 3  w4 p 
x1   0.83 -0.35 0.05 -0.17 -0.18 0.65 
∆x2  0.11 0.19 -2.00 0.52 -0.60 1.88 
x3  0.04 -0.96 0.75 -1.86 -1.57 3.63 
x4  0.03 -0.77 -0.64 -1.16 -1.45 4.02 
q    -0.11 -0.08 -0.11 -0.16 0.47 
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Appendix 3 
Table A3a. Effects of policy on labor, investments, electricity, fuel, output, emissions, 
and profits (percentage change). Mining sector except iron ore. All benchmark values 
from 2001 (specific mean values for each sector). 
Step 1 
 D_x11 D_∆x21D _ x 31D _ x 41
Sim1  0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.036
Sim2  0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.036
Sim3  0.007 0.009 0.002 -0.071
Sim4  0.007 0.009 0.002 -0.072
Sim5  0.018 0.023 0.004 -0.179
Sim6  0.018 0.023 0.004 -0.179
Step 2 
 D_x12  D_∆x22 D_x32 D_x42
Sim1  -0.006 -0.056 -0.037 0.002
Sim2  -0.006 -0.056 -0.037 0.002
Sim3  -0.012 -0.111 -0.075 0.003
Sim4  -0.012 -0.111 -0.075 0.003
Sim5  -0.024 -0.222 -0.149 0.007
Sim6  -0.024 -0.222 -0.149 0.007
Total effect 
 D_  x1 D_  ∆x2 D_ x3 D_ x4
Sim1  -0.002 -0.051 -0.036 -0.034
Sim2  -0.002 -0.051 -0.036 -0.034
Sim3  -0.005 -0.102 -0.073 -0.068
Sim4  -0.005 -0.102 -0.073 -0.068
Sim5  -0.005 -0.199 -0.145 -0.172
Sim6  -0.005 -0.199 -0.145 -0.173
 D_q  D_CO2  D_π
Sim1  -0.006 -0.034 -0.005
Sim2  -0.006 -0.034 -0.005
Sim3  -0.012 -0.068 -0.011
Sim4  -0.012 -0.068 -0.011
Sim5  -0.025 -0.172 -0.024
Sim6  -0.025 -0.173 -0.024
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Table A3b. Effects of policy on labor, investments, electricity, fuel, output, emissions, 
and profits (percentage change). Iron ore mining sector. All benchmark values from 
2001 (specific mean values for each sector). 
Step 1 
 D_x11 D_∆x21D _ x 31D _ x 41
Sim1  0.002 0.046 0.041 0.066
Sim2  -0.002 -0.032 -0.028 -0.045
Sim3  0.001 0.015 0.013 0.021
Sim4  -0.003 -0.064 -0.056 -0.091
Sim5  -0.004 -0.081 -0.071 -0.115
Sim6  -0.008 -0.159 -0.139 -0.227
Step 2 
 D_x12  D_∆x22 D_x32 D_x42
Sim1  0.008 -0.039 -0.071 -0.091
Sim2  0.008 -0.039 -0.071 -0.091
Sim3  0.017 -0.079 -0.142 -0.183
Sim4  0.017 -0.079 -0.142 -0.183
Sim5  0.033 -0.158 -0.284 -0.366
Sim6  0.033 -0.158 -0.284 -0.366
Total effect 
 D_  x1 D_  ∆x2 D_ x3 D_ x4
Sim1  0.011 0.007 -0.030 -0.025
Sim2  0.007 -0.071 -0.099 -0.137
Sim3  0.018 -0.064 -0.129 -0.162
Sim4  0.013 -0.143 -0.197 -0.274
Sim5  0.029 -0.239 -0.354 -0.481
Sim6  0.025 -0.317 -0.422 -0.593
 D_q  D_CO2  D_π
Sim1  0.000 -0.025 -0.006
Sim2  -0.021 -0.137 -0.009
Sim3  -0.022 -0.162 -0.015
Sim4  -0.043 -0.274 -0.018
Sim5  -0.073 -0.481 -0.034
Sim6  -0.094 -0.593 -0.037
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Table A3c. Effects of policy on labor, investments, electricity, fuel, output, emissions, 
and profits (percentage change). Pulp and paper sector. All benchmark values from 
2001 (specific mean values for each sector). 
Step 1 
 D_x11 D_∆x21D _ x 31D _ x 41
Sim1  0.005 0.049 0.028 0.068
Sim2  -0.002 -0.020 -0.012 -0.028
Sim3  0.003 0.029 0.017 0.040
Sim4  -0.004 -0.040 -0.023 -0.056
Sim5  -0.003 -0.031 -0.018 -0.043
Sim6  -0.010 -0.100 -0.058 -0.139
Step 2 
 D_x12  D_∆x22 D_x32 D_x42
Sim1  -0.031 -0.088 -0.036 -0.041
Sim2  -0.031 -0.088 -0.036 -0.041
Sim3  -0.062 -0.176 -0.073 -0.081
Sim4  -0.062 -0.176 -0.073 -0.081
Sim5  -0.125 -0.352 -0.146 -0.163
Sim6  -0.125 -0.352 -0.146 -0.163
Total effect 
 D_  x1 D_  ∆x2 D_ x3 D_ x4
Sim1  -0.026 -0.039 -0.008 0.027
Sim2  -0.033 -0.108 -0.048 -0.069
Sim3  -0.059 -0.147 -0.056 -0.041
Sim4  -0.067 -0.216 -0.096 -0.137
Sim5  -0.128 -0.384 -0.164 -0.206
Sim6  -0.135 -0.452 -0.203 -0.302
 D_q  D_CO2  D_π
Sim1  -0.006 0.027 -0.002
Sim2  -0.018 -0.069 -0.004
Sim3  -0.024 -0.041 -0.006
Sim4  -0.036 -0.137 -0.008
Sim5  -0.064 -0.206 -0.015
Sim6  -0.076 -0.302 -0.016
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Table A3d. Effects of policy on labor, investments, electricity, fuel, output, emissions, 
and profits (percentage change). Chemical sector. All benchmark values from 2001 
(specific mean values for each sector). 
Step 1 
 D_x11 D_∆x21D _ x 31D _ x 41
Sim1  0.002 -0.004 -0.013 -0.047
Sim2  0.003 -0.005 -0.017 -0.058
Sim3  0.005 -0.009 -0.030 -0.105
Sim4  0.006 -0.010 -0.033 -0.116
Sim5  0.013 -0.023 -0.080 -0.280
Sim6  0.014 -0.024 -0.083 -0.291
Step 2 
 D_x12  D_∆x22 D_x32 D_x42
Sim1  0.007 0.024 -0.126 -0.054
Sim2  0.007 0.024 -0.126 -0.054
Sim3  0.013 0.048 -0.253 -0.107
Sim4  0.013 0.048 -0.253 -0.107
Sim5  0.026 0.096 -0.506 -0.215
Sim6  0.026 0.096 -0.506 -0.215
Total effect 
 D_  x1 D_  ∆x2 D_ x3 D_ x4
Sim1  0.009 0.020 -0.140 -0.101
Sim2  0.009 0.019 -0.143 -0.112
Sim3  0.018 0.039 -0.283 -0.213
Sim4  0.019 0.039 -0.286 -0.224
Sim5  0.040 0.073 -0.586 -0.495
Sim6  0.040 0.072 -0.589 -0.506
 D_q  D_CO2  D_π
Sim1  -0.004 -0.101 -0.010
Sim2  -0.004 -0.112 -0.011
Sim3  -0.008 -0.213 -0.021
Sim4  -0.008 -0.224 -0.021
Sim5  -0.017 -0.495 -0.043
Sim6  -0.017 -0.506 -0.043
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Table A3e. Effects of policy on labor, investments, electricity, fuel, output, emissions, 
and profits (percentage change). Rubber and plastic sector. All benchmark values from 
2001 (specific mean values for each sector). 
Step 1 
 D_x11 D_∆x21D _ x 31D _ x 41
Sim1  0.000 -0.002 0.004 -0.038
Sim2  0.000 -0.002 0.004 -0.040
Sim3  0.001 -0.003 0.008 -0.078
Sim4  0.001 -0.003 0.008 -0.080
Sim5  0.001 -0.008 0.021 -0.198
Sim6  0.001 -0.008 0.021 -0.200
Step 2 
 D_x12  D_∆x22 D_x32 D_x42
Sim1  -0.002 0.005 -0.057 0.026
Sim2  -0.002 0.005 -0.057 0.026
Sim3  -0.003 0.011 -0.113 0.051
Sim4  -0.003 0.011 -0.113 0.051
Sim5  -0.007 0.022 -0.227 0.102
Sim6  -0.007 0.022 -0.227 0.102
Total effect 
 D_  x1 D_  ∆x2 D_ x3 D_ x4
Sim1  -0.001 0.004 -0.053 -0.013
Sim2  -0.001 0.004 -0.053 -0.014
Sim3  -0.003 0.008 -0.105 -0.027
Sim4  -0.003 0.008 -0.105 -0.029
Sim5  -0.005 0.014 -0.206 -0.096
Sim6  -0.005 0.014 -0.206 -0.098
 D_q  D_CO2  D_π
Sim1  -0.001 -0.013 -0.003
Sim2  -0.001 -0.014 -0.003
Sim3  -0.002 -0.027 -0.005
Sim4  -0.002 -0.029 -0.005
Sim5  -0.005 -0.096 -0.011
Sim6  -0.005 -0.098 -0.011
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Table A3f. Effects of policy on labor, investments, electricity, fuel, output, emissions, 
and profits (percentage change). Stone and non-metal mineral sector. All benchmark 
values from 2001 (specific mean values for each sector). * indicates changes of more 
than 100%. 
Step 1 
 D_x11 D_∆x21D _ x 31D _ x 41
Sim1  -0.004 -0.027 -0.103 -0.132
Sim2  -0.008 -0.048 -0.181 -0.231
Sim3  -0.012 -0.076 -0.284 -0.363
Sim4  -0.015 -0.096 -0.361 -0.462
Sim5*  * * * *
Sim6*  * * * *
Step 2 
 D_x12  D_∆x22 D_x32 D_x42
Sim1  -0.010 -0.006 -0.029 -0.034
Sim2  -0.010 -0.006 -0.029 -0.034
Sim3  -0.021 -0.013 -0.057 -0.068
Sim4  -0.021 -0.013 -0.057 -0.068
Sim5  -0.042 -0.026 -0.114 -0.137
Sim6  -0.042 -0.026 -0.114 -0.137
Total effect 
 D_  x1 D_  ∆x2 D_ x3 D_ x4
Sim1  -0.015 -0.034 -0.132 -0.166
Sim2  -0.018 -0.055 -0.209 -0.265
Sim3  -0.033 -0.089 -0.341 -0.432
Sim4  -0.036 -0.109 -0.418 -0.531
Sim5*  * * * *
Sim6*  * * * *
 D_q  D_CO2  D_π
Sim1  -0.024 -0.166 -0.010
Sim2  -0.037 -0.265 -0.014
Sim3  -0.062 -0.432 -0.024
Sim4  -0.075 -0.531 -0.029
Sim5*  * * *
Sim6*  * * *
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Table A3g. Effects of policy on labor, investments, electricity, fuel, output, emissions, 
and profits (percentage change). Iron and steel sector. All benchmark values from 2001 
(specific mean values for each sector). 
Step 1 
 D_x11  D_∆x21 D_x31 D_x41
Sim1  0.005 0.018 0.047 0.043
Sim2  -0.011 -0.035 -0.091 -0.084
Sim3  -0.005 -0.017 -0.044 -0.041
Sim4  -0.021 -0.070 -0.182 -0.168
Sim5  -0.037 -0.121 -0.318 -0.293
Sim6  -0.053 -0.174 -0.456 -0.420
Step 2 
 D_x12  D_∆x22 D_x32 D_x42
Sim1  -0.012 0.037 -0.133 -0.083
Sim2  -0.012 0.037 -0.133 -0.083
Sim3  -0.024 0.074 -0.265 -0.166
Sim4  -0.024 0.074 -0.265 -0.166
Sim5  -0.048 0.148 -0.530 -0.332
Sim6  -0.048 0.148 -0.530 -0.332
Total effect 
 D_  x1 D_  ∆x2 D_ x3 D_ x4
Sim1  -0.007 0.055 -0.086 -0.040
Sim2  -0.023 0.002 -0.224 -0.167
Sim3  -0.029 0.057 -0.310 -0.207
Sim4  -0.045 0.004 -0.447 -0.334
Sim5  -0.085 0.027 -0.848 -0.625
Sim6  -0.102 -0.026 -0.986 -0.753
 D_q  D_CO2  D_π
Sim1  -0.003 -0.040 -0.001
Sim2  -0.017 -0.167 -0.004
Sim3  -0.020 -0.207 -0.006
Sim4  -0.035 -0.334 -0.008
Sim5  -0.065 -0.625 -0.016
Sim6  -0.079 -0.753 -0.019
  